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Abstract
Privacy has become the law’s chameleon, simultaneously everywhere and
nowhere. This is particularly true of the workplace where employees often seek some
private space but where the law, particularly the formidable employment-at-will rule,
typically frustrates that search. As the workplace has expanded both in its scope and
importance, additional concerns have been raised about an employer’s potential reach
outside of the workplace. In this symposium contribution, I explore the privacy issue by
asking a fundamental question: what do employees deserve? My answer is that, as a
matter of policy, we ought to concede privacy issues as the employer’s domain at the
specific workplace. This is, in part, because for most employees workplace privacy is not
a central concern and the justifications for broad protections of workplace privacy are
often quite weak. While conceding the workplace as the employer’s domain, I also
advocate creating a strict barrier to employer encroachments outside of the workplace so
that employers would not be able to interfere with the off-work activity of their
employees absent some compelling justification. This would include circumstances in
which employers provide employees with computers or other gadgets that employees are
permitted to use outside of the workplace.

Privacy for the Working Class: Public Work and
Private Lives
Michael Selmi*
I. INTRODUCTION
At the turn of the twenty-first century, privacy has become the
law’s chameleon, seemingly everywhere and nowhere at the same
time. The recent outpouring of privacy literature touches on many
constitutional doctrines, including the mainstay in judicial hearings
of the right to abortion, as well as search and seizure under the
Fourth Amendment.1 The hugely controversial Patriot Act, passed
in the aftermath of September 11th, has stirred up privacy concerns
among a broad array of groups, and in recent years Congress has
passed numerous laws protecting privacy interests ranging from
medical data to financial information and much in between.2
Privacy concerns are seemingly everywhere these days.
Yet, despite all of this attention, the law surrounding privacy,
and the basic definition of privacy, retains the enigmatic quality it
has always had. Many trace the origins of privacy within the law
to the seminal article by Brandeis and Warren entitled, “The Right

Copyright 2006, by Louisiana Law Review.
Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. An
earlier version of this paper was presented at the Examining Privacy In the
Workplace Symposium held at Louisiana State University Law Center, where I
benefited from the spirited comments from all of the participants. I also
benefited from a faculty workshop at the University of Connecticut Law School.
I am grateful to Matthew Finkin and Charlie Craver for additional comments,
and to Peerepa Joann Moolsintong for research assistance.
1. Much of this scholarship has been written by my colleagues at George
Washington. See, e.g., Orin Kerr, The Fourth Amendment in Cyberspace: Can
Encryption Create “A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy?”, 33 Conn. L. Rev.
503 (2001); Jeffrey Rosen, The Unwanted Gaze: The Destruction of Privacy in
America (Random House 2000); Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90
Cal. L. Rev. 1087 (2002); Sonia M. Suter, Disentangling Privacy from Property:
Toward a Deeper Understanding of Genetic Privacy, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
737 (2004).
2. For example, pursuant to the Graham-Leach-Bilely Act of 1999,
banking institutions, securities firms, and insurance companies must provide
notices regarding their privacy policies and permit customers to opt out of the
policies. See 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (1998). These notices are routinely discarded
and seem to serve little purpose other than to convey an impression that privacy
is being protected. See, e.g., John Schwartz, Privacy Policy Notices Are Called
Too Common and Too Confusing, N.Y. Times, May 7, 2001, at A1.
*
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to Privacy,”3 in which they defined privacy as “the right to be left
alone,”4 and much of contemporary privacy doctrine flows from a
sparse phrase in a concurring opinion to a criminal case, in which
the Supreme Court defined the scope of Fourth Amendment
protections as premised on a reasonable expectation of privacy.5
In addition to the curious doctrinal origins and grounding in the
law, there is an undeniably prurient quality to the idea of privacy
which clouds the concept with ambivalence. Although we
steadfastly guard our own privacy and expansively define our own
private sphere, virtually all of us seek to peer into the private zones
of others.
Another curious aspect of the privacy literature, as well as the
recent Congressional attention, is that it frequently ignores
workplace issues, certainly one of the areas of greatest concern
with respect to privacy encroachments.6 Part of this lack of
attention is attributable to ignorance of workplace law, but privacy,
like so many aspects of the workplace, has also largely been a
casualty of the law’s obeisance to the employment-at-will
principle. As a basic precept, it is difficult to reconcile workplace
privacy with the at-will relationship. If an employee can be fired
for any reason or no reason at all, as the relationship is often
defined, how can an employee assert a right to privacy when he or
she has so few rights to begin with? Moreover, within the existing
legal framework, so long as an employer provides notice of an
intent to restrict an employee’s privacy, it is difficult for that
employee to claim a reasonable expectation of privacy. Like so
much that involves the employment-at-will rule, the typical
antidote to invasions of privacy is for the employee to find another
job; to exit, borrowing the typology of Albert Hirschman.7
As this brief discussion shows, workplace privacy issues go
deeper than simply protecting some private space and I will
suggest that the issues surrounding privacy are representative of
the broader transformation that has occurred in the workplace over
3. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv.
L. Rev. 193 (1890).
4. Id.
5. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
6. I would be remiss if I did not note that workplace privacy has been
explored by a number of important employment law scholars, several of whom
are participating in this symposium. See, e.g., Matthew Finkin, Privacy in
Employment Law (BNA 2d ed. 2003); Pauline Kim, Privacy Rights, Public
Policy, and the Employment Relationship, 57 Ohio St. L.J. 671 (1996); William
R. Corbett, The Need for a Revitalized Common Law of the Workplace, 69
Brook. L. Rev. 91, 101–19 (2003).
7. See Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty (Harvard University
Press 1970).
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the last three decades one where the individual has triumphed
over the collective, where solemnity of privacy has displaced the
power of speech and collective action as a paramount workplace
value, and perhaps most important, one in which the employer’s
power over employees now goes virtually unchallenged. Not only
has the power of employers expanded but the reach of the
workplace has likewise been extended into what used to be
considered private domains. Although many recoiled at the notion
(and still do so today), at one time, the slogan “work is for
working” reasonably captured the essence of the employment
relationship. When one was at work, she worked, but after work
was, well, after work. Today, that is no longer true as what is
sometimes called the boundaryless workplace8 now entraps
employees far from the confines of the workplace and with
virtually no compensating benefits.
As a result, when we think about privacy in the workplace
today, we run up against what is perhaps the preeminent question
of contemporary employment policy: how much of oneself must
one relinquish to become an employee? How much of oneself,
one’s life, does a worker turn over to the employer by agreeing to
work for a wage? To get at these questions, we also have to
address another, perhaps more fundamental question—what do
employees deserve in the workplace? What kind of protection
should they have, and how do we get there? Under the old union
model, the answer to these questions was relatively
straightforward: workers deserved as much privacy, as many
workplace benefits, as they could get. But in a world without
unions, one that we are dangerously close to approaching today
where unions represent about eight percent of the private
workforce,9 we must step back and look elsewhere for answers,
8. Professor Kathy Stone coined this phrase to indicate how the ties
between employers, employees and work have changed. See, e.g., Katherine
V.W. Stone, From Widgets to Digits: Employment Regulation for the Changing
Workplace (Cambridge University Press 2004); Katherine V.W. Stone,
Employee Representation in the Boundaryless Workplace, 77 Chi.-Kent L. Rev.
773 (2002); Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract:
Implications of the Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48
UCLA L. Rev. 519 (2001).
9. Based on data collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, in 2005,
unions represented 7.8% of the private workforce. The latest figures are
available at www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm.
Unions have a
significantly higher presence among public employers, but because so many
public union members do not have the right to strike and many are part of nonbargaining unions it is more difficult to assess the strength or value of unions in
the public workplace.
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and invariably, we are likely to arrive at different answers
altogether.
Before proceeding further, I should note that this essay is part
of a larger project in which I broadly reexamine the employment
relationship. I intend this essay to be mostly a normative thought
piece, and I am less concerned, at this juncture, about how my
vision would be translated into reality. Instead, I want to focus on
how we ought to conceive of privacy in the workplace in a way
that best protects the legitimate interests of working-class
employees. I also want to set forth this vision against the reigning
principle of employment-at-will. If we are willing to do away with
the employment-at-will rule, we could likely transform the
workplace in a significant fashion simply by imposing a just cause
requirement, or some other limitation on an employer’s power.
But it is far more difficult to craft workplace protections for
employees against the at-will backdrop, which is what I will seek
to do in this brief paper by limiting the definition of employment,
rather than seeking to limit an employer’s power within that space.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE WORKPLACE AND THE RISE OF PRIVACY
INTERESTS
By now, the evolution of the workplace over the last three
decades is a well-known tale.10 Rather than retell that story, I want
to focus on the way in which issues surrounding workplace privacy
reflect the shift from a collective workplace mentality to the
individualistic approach that dominates today.
The story that is typically told emphasizes the decline of unions
as well as the decline of lifetime employment the two of which
are obviously closely related, although it is also important to note
that neither ever fully or accurately defined the workplace. Given
the nostalgia we have for a lost era of labor dominance, it is always
important to emphasize that at their peak, from the mid-1940s to
1954, unions represented slightly more than one-third of the
10. Two of the more prominent discussions are found in Peter Capelli, The
New Deal at Work: Managing the Market-Driven Workforce (Harvard Business
School Press 1999) and Katherine V.W. Stone, supra, note 8. See also Paul
Osterman, Securing Prosperity: The American Labor Market: How It has
Changed and What to Do About It (Princeton University Press 1999); Stephen
F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millenium: A Historical Review
and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. Rev. 351 (2002). For two recent and
interesting explorations of the contemporary workplace see Alan Hyde, Working
in Silicon Valley: Economic and Legal Analysis of a High-Velocity Labor
Market (M. E. Sharpe 2003) and Andrew Ross, No-Collar: The Humane
Workplace and Its Hidden Costs (Temple University Press 2003).
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workforce,11 and the idea of lifetime employment was a benefit
largely restricted to white males. Even within that group, many
workers never obtained the benefits of steady lifetime
employment.
Regardless of its reality, there is little question that the idea of
lifetime employment with steady upward progression captured the
academic imagination, and I would also suggest that, in an
important way, that idea represented the reality of the workplace.
Even though unions never represented a majority of the workplace,
through much of the 1970s the threat of unionization was real with
union density rates hovering at or above thirty percent, and the
presence and threat of unions made collective activity the most
important employee workplace value.12 By definition, collective
activity was primarily public in nature, and necessarily relied on
speech and other important First Amendment values, as embodied
in the National Labor Relations Act. From this perspective,
solitary activity or privacy was far less important to workers than
organizing, and this was also true in the non-unionized workplace,
where seniority rather than merit often determined promotions,
pay, and other workplace benefits. Within the union model, what
was important was the ability to meet, to congregate, and to
organize, to share information rather than to hide it. While privacy
was sometimes important to those efforts, it was at most an
instrumental, rather than a core, value solidarity rather than
solitude mattered most.
In that nostalgic workplace, privacy was also of less import
because there was less of an opportunity for privacy. When we
think about manufacturing plants, auto assembly lines, even a
workspace like IBM or Kodak where often only the managers had
their own private offices, there was often literally no place to hide,
no place for meaningful privacy. While workers have always
sought to hide misdeeds from their employers, such as drinking,
errors, or theft, no one but the most zealous of employee advocates
would see employee privacy interests at stake in such behavior.
No one has a right to drink on the job, and no one can hide behind
11. 1954 is most frequently cited as the apex of union power when unions
represented approximately 34% (33.7%) of the nonagricultural labor force. The
percentage, however, was nearly identical in 1946 (34.5%) although in absolute
terms unions had more members in the mid-1950s. The numbers have declined
ever since although the decline accelerated most significantly after 1974. For a
historical table see Ronald G. Ehrenberg & Robert S. Smith, Modern Labor
Economics: Theory and Public Policy Table 477 tbl. 13.2 (Addison Wesley
Longman 6th ed. 1997).
12. See Osterman, supra note 10, at 30 (discussing spillover effect of union
practices in non-union workplaces through the 1970s).
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the cloak of privacy when their behavior directly interferes with
their work. Rather, the primary question would be how far an
employer might be able to go to uncover such behavior (for
example, by searching a locker) but not whether the activity itself
could be protected. At the same time, to the extent that an
employee’s off-work drinking or other activities did not interfere
with her employment, there might be a protectable privacy interest
because that behavior was none of the employer’s business.
Not only was there no place to hide in many workplaces, but
there was also less to hide. This was particularly true against the
backdrop of lifetime employment: when employees expected to
remain with their employer for the length of their career, they had
fewer reasons to hide things, or even to keep them private, either
from their employer or fellow employees. Trade secrets, even
when present, were less of a threat in an environment of long-term
employment because the greatest threat to trade secrets often
comes from employees who are changing jobs.13 By the same
measure, because employees were not typically competing against
each other for jobs, there was also no particular reason to conceal
secrets or opportunities from coworkers.
Even in stable
workforces, there would likely be competition for promotions, but
much of that competition was limited and seniority-driven, which
imposed additional restraints on the need for workplace privacy
with respect to other employees.
In these stable workplaces where lifetime employment was at
least a possibility, there was also a stronger element of trust
between employers and their workers, and that trust again rendered
privacy less significant.14 Employees trusted their employers to
give them a fair shake, to avoid arbitrary layoffs, and at a
minimum, to soften whatever blows might be forthcoming.15
Long-term relationships require trust, and for the most part,
employers lived up to their obligation. In return, employers
expected their employees to remain during the good times and bad,
13. In the modern workplace, this threat is represented in the doctrine of
inevitable disclosure which permits employers to enjoin employees from
moving to competitors out of a fear that the employee will “inevitably disclose”
trade secrets. The leading case in this area is Pepsico, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d
1262 (7th Cir. 1995). The doctrine is controversial but there is little question
that employers often view their current employees as potential threats to trade
secrets. For a recent discussion see Catherine Fisk, Knowledge Work: New
Metaphors for the New Economy, 80 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 839, 854–56 (2005).
14. For an analysis of loyalty and trust in the modern workplace see Ken
Matheny & Marion Crain, Disloyal Workers and the “Un-American” Labor
Law, 82 N.C. L. Rev. 1705 (2004).
15. See Osterman, supra note 10, at 10–11 (discussing implicit contracts in
old labor model).
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rather than moving to any better opportunity that might come
along, as frequently occurs in the contemporary labor market.
Although it may be less apparent, this sense of loyalty and duty
was present even in a unionized workplace where both parties—
while adversarial—were, at a minimum, expected to play by the
rules, and again, for the most part, both sides abided by those rules.
There were certainly strikes, and there have always been aberrant
or rogue employers (and employees) but even in a world where the
lines were drawn in an adversarial way, trust formed an important
aspect of the workplace relationship.16
Once this workplace was dismantled, as it largely has been
today, privacy became of greater importance to employees and, on
the flipside, a greater threat to employers. Suspicion displaced
trust or allegiance as the defining characteristic of the employment
relationship. Added to the mix, technology unquestionably
changed the nature of the workplace for many. In the past, a
closed door, or a locked locker, might have offered some degree of
privacy, but most employees would not have claimed a right to
keep their employer out of their office, though perhaps out of their
desk. But when e-mail replaced the telephone (or fax) as a
common means of communication, it became easier for employees
to feel a sense of privacy. While the substance of phone
conversations might be presumptively private, there were almost
always records of the telephone calls and employers have long
been afforded the right to listen in on conversations to determine
whether the call relates to business matters.17 So whatever privacy
claim there might have been was limited and dependent on the
employer’s policy permitting the use of the telephone.
E-mail and the Internet initially felt different, as it was at least
originally thought that there were fewer records, and while it is
easy to tell when someone is on the telephone, it is not so easy to
determine when an employee might be using e-mail or the Internet.
Of course, we are now conditioned to realize that e-mail
communications and Internet usage do leave records,18 but many
16. See Richard Sennett, The Culture of the New Capitalism 63–67 (Yale
University Press 2006) (discussing decline of trust in modern workplace). There
is an analogy here to litigation, which has always been adversarial by nature but
is today far more so and far less trusting as too many lawyers seek to get an edge
any way they can.
17. See, e.g., Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577 (11th Cir. 1983)
(noting that employers have the right to listen in to telephone calls).
18. When I first started teaching employment law some ten years ago, my
informal classroom polls routinely indicated about two-thirds of the class
considered workplace e-mail to be private. Last year, not a single student
suggested as much.
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employees, and professors, still cling to the notion that there is
something more private about these communications and that they
ought to be treated as private even if they technically are not.
Technological advances have also enabled employers to act on
their suspicions by providing them with more far-reaching means
to snoop on their employees. Up until the middle of the 1980s,
employers were relegated to monitoring their employees through
physical means, either by direct observation or in some workplaces
by videotape. But today the means of observation have increased
exponentially, and one of the more important aspects of these new
developments, and one that renders them distinct from physical
monitoring, is that employees today are often unaware of their
employer’s spying. Cameras can be hidden just about anywhere,
technology can monitor keystrokes, and movements throughout the
workplace, and tracking devices can be implanted without easy
detection.
Thus, privacy appears to have replaced speech as a matter of
primary workplace concern. However, whereas the National Labor
Relations Act protects speech integral to collective action, there is
little statutory workplace protection for employee privacy interests.
Other than the curious Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, which
might be seen as affording some privacy by generally banning the
use of polygraphs, there are few federal statutory protections,
though there are a substantial number of state statutes.19 Assuming
that unions will not be present to provide protections via collective
bargaining agreements, the underlying policy question is what kind
of protection do workers deserve?
III. DEFINING THE PROPER SCOPE OF EMPLOYEE PRIVACY
As noted at the outset, employee privacy forms an
uncomfortable fit within the employment-at-will rule, which
largely treats the workplace as the employer’s property, affording
employees few if any rights that might conflict with that property
interest. Even if we do not see the workplace as the exclusive
domain of employers, there is little question that employers have
legitimate interests that often conflict with employees’ desires for
19. See Polygraph Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001–2009 (1999). The
other obvious relevant statute, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(ECPA), often proves ephemeral in its protections because employers are
generally afforded the right to capture employee e-mails in the ordinary course
of business. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2000); Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,
352 F.3d 107 (3rd Cir. 2004) (retrieval of stored e-mail messages did not violate
ECPA). More to the point for my purposes, ECPA was passed in 1986 before
the widespread advent of electronic communications in the workplace.
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workplace privacy.
Concerns about trade secrets, possible
harassment suits, employee theft, efficiency in the workplace,
unauthorized use of property, and so on, all justify keeping a watch
on employees in a way that might infringe upon their privacy
interests. To the extent we equate privacy with an ability, or a
desire, to hide things, employers are rightfully suspicious of broad
declarations of privacy rights for their employees.
For that reason, it is generally difficult to define a legitimate
expectation of privacy in work actions. By work actions, I mean
the conduct of work, or the time one spends at work, separate and
apart from invasions of employee bodies themselves. When
employees are at work, it is simply difficult to identify any proper
basis for a privacy interest that an employee could legitimately
claim, or one that might trump an employer’s interest. Even the
name of the basic tort protection for privacy, intrusion upon
seclusion, has little meaning in the workplace where employees
have little to no opportunity for seclusion.20 This is not a matter of
consent, as the law sometimes treats it, but rather a realization that
the employee has been hired to work, and has no right to send
private e-mails, view pornography, shop, blog, instant message, or
talk on the telephone. Employers may tolerate many of these
activities, and good management practices would counsel broad
tolerance, but tolerance is surely different from establishing a
legitimate expectation of privacy. Indeed, I would suggest that the
only way we can see legitimate employee privacy interests in these
activities is because we have come to expect too much of the
workplace, thinking of the workplace as an extension of our home
where we interchange work and personal activities.
Where, I think, an interest may lie, though not necessarily in
the form of privacy, is through an implied contract when the
employer either tolerates or permits certain actions. It seems
manifestly unfair for an employer to confer privacy rights through
policies, written or implied, and then to turn around and ignore
those policies when it is advantageous to do so. This has always
seemed the most troublesome part of the well-known Smyth v.
Pillsbury21 case, in which an employee was fired for sending a
rather inappropriate e-mail despite the employer’s explicit policy
stating that the company would not review e-mail. This is also the
20. Intrusion upon seclusion is one of the four basic privacy torts, and the
one that is most commonly asserted for workplace violations. Intrusion upon
seclusion requires that the defendant (a) intentionally intruded, physically or
otherwise; (b) on the solitude or seclusion of another or on his private affairs or
concerns; (c) in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person. Restatement
(Second) of Torts ' 652B (1977).
21. 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
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most important aspect of the Rulon-Miller22 case where the court
enforced the company’s written policy as an implied contract right.
Courts are well situated to enforce employer policies under
contractual principles, at least until those policies are changed, and
to do so as a matter of basic fairness.23
Within this broad principle of the lack of privacy rights at
work, I would include the recent implementation of global
positioning devices in vehicles and occasionally on individuals.
These devices provide locational information of employees, and
many employers have installed them on all of their vehicles, and
hospitals have also implanted GPS-like devices in the badges of
nurses to determine who can be best deployed to the next
assignment.24 The introduction of these devices has often proved
controversial with many claiming that they infringe on employee
privacy interests while demonstrating a lack of respect for
employees.25
Yet, within the framework of the work-is-for-working
paradigm, individuals would have a difficult time establishing a
violation of a legitimate privacy interest. An employer surely has a
right to know where its employees are, and what they are doing. If
22. See Rulon-Miller v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 208 Cal. Rptr. 524 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1984) (upholding jury verdict for employee fired for a dating relationship
on the grounds that the discharge violated the employer’s express policy that
outside activities were a matter of privacy unless they interfered with workplace
performance).
23. Because most employment policies are imposed unilaterally by
employers without any negotiation with employees, courts generally allow
employers to change those policies without providing additional consideration,
as would typically be required in many other contract settings. For various
approaches to policy modifications see Asmus v. Pac. Bell, 96 Cal. Reptr. 2d
179 (2000) (permitting employers to alter policies so long as notice is provided,
the policy was in place for some reasonable period of time, and no affected
rights have vested); Govier v. North Sound Bank, 957 P.2d 811 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1998) (new policy effective upon notice); Demasse v. ITT Corp., 984 P.2d
1138 (Ariz. 1999) (requiring assent and consideration for effective
modification).
24. These devices have been much in the news lately, in part because their
prices have declined to make them economically efficient to install on a wider
basis. For recent discussions see Matthew W. Finkin, Information Technology
& Workers’ Privacy: The United States Law, 23 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol’y J. 471,
490 (2002); Stacy A. Teicher, It’s 2 a.m. Do you Know Where Your Workers
Are? Christian Sci. Monitor, Dec. 22, 2003, at 14.
25. The use of GPS devices in the workplace gained prominence after
Boston sought to install GPS devices on all of its snow plows and the snow plow
drivers responded by threatening to refuse to work. The issue was ultimately
resolved, and GPS devices are becoming increasingly common, particularly on
vehicles. See Anthony Flint, Plow Operators, State Agree on Deal on Satellite
Phones, Boston Globe, Dec. 6, 2003, at B6.
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an employer were to stop by one’s office, or call on the telephone
to inquire about an employee’s whereabouts, no one would
imagine it proper to respond, “I am sorry but that is a matter of
privacy.” The same would certainly be true if the employer called
a driver to ask where she was, or sought to follow the driver in a
car. While the GPS devices may seem more intrusive, functionally
they are little more than a substitute for visual monitoring.
Obviously, the fact that the devices are more effective, and
efficient, than visual monitoring cannot by itself give rise to a
legitimate privacy interest. A problem may arise if the employer
permits the use of a company vehicle equipped with a GPS device
for personal use, in which case there ought to be a means of
disabling the device when work activity has ended.26 But as I
discuss below, a far better approach would be for employees not to
use their employers’ cars for personal use, and not to accept that
benefit in lieu of monetary compensation.
I do not mean to suggest that employers should be free to do
what they please with their employees during working hours. If it
were up to me, I would draw the line at physical intrusions of an
individual’s body without at least some substantial employer
justification. What I do mean to suggest, however, is that there is
more at stake in defining workplace privacy than trying to provide
a space for employees to engage in activities otherwise forbidden
by their employers. Privacy as a concept involves fundamental
issues of human dignity, autonomy, and the right of individuals to
have some control over their public persona. Even outside the
workplace, this is a difficult concept to define, but without a
modicum of privacy we would hardly be who we are.
Yet, within the workplace, the idea of tying privacy to an
element of human dignity once again runs smack up against the atwill doctrine, which so often ignores issues of dignity. Workplace
dignity is primarily about respect, and while providing a space for
privacy may reflect respect, it is not the essence of what we
consider dignity within the employment relationship. Indeed, it is
not at all clear that privacy is the crucial “dignity” value if we
were concerned about employee dignity, we ought to begin by
requiring employers to pay a living wage. Compared to wages and
even working conditions, consider the recent mining disasters in

26. Many of these devices can be readily disabled. See Cindy Water,
Navigating Privacy Concerns to Equip Workers With GPS, Workforce Mgt.,
Aug. 1, 2005, at 71 (noting that many devices can be clicked off with a switch).
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West Virginia,27 privacy is at most a secondary or even a tertiary
workplace value. All of us would undoubtedly like more privacy,
and ideally be able to define the scope of our privacy, but in the
end, it is not what work is about necessarily, particularly for the
working class who traditionally have been afforded far less privacy
than more elite employees and typically value it less. As Michele
Lamont notes in her recent exploration of working-class men in the
United States and France, “[B]lue-collar workers put family above
work, and find greater satisfaction in family than do upper middle
class men.”28 As a result, most working-class employees would
likely place higher wages and employment security well above
privacy as an important workplace value.
One of the problems we have in defining the proper space for
workplace privacy is that it is no longer clear what work is about,
what the boundaries of work are, or even what it means to be an
employee. This is where I think we might make the most headway
in defining workplace privacy, and that is by defining the
workplace more narrowly, and an employer’s interests more
specifically. When it comes to issues of privacy, the absence of
workplace boundaries becomes deeply problematic and provides
the strongest basis for imposing limits on an employer’s right to
peer into the private lives of its workers. It is one thing to give an
employer broad dominion over its own workplace but quite
another to extend that dominion wherever the employee goes.
For example, just because an employee works from home
should not give an employer the right to look into that home, or
into an individual’s private life. One of the central values to
privacy is the right to determine how much of one’s self one wants
to reveal to the world, and while the desire to control one’s public
persona is not always faithfully executed or observed, it is central
to our vision of individual autonomy. We simply would not be the
people we are if our entire lives were open to public view. The
employment relationship should be no different. To the extent that
an employer requires its employees to work from home beyond a
normal workweek, the employer ought to relinquish any right to
control the way in which that work is done, or at least relinquish
the right to invade one’s privacy. After all, there is a simple
antidote to the extra work: hire additional employees or require
27. See James Dao & Felicity Barringer, Disaster at the Mine: Miners Went
By the Book, But Time Ran Out, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 2006, at A1 (discussing
death of 12 miners in West Virginia explosion).
28. Michele Lamont, The Dignity of Working Men: Morality and the
Boundaries of Race, Class and Imagination 30 ( Harvard University Press 2000).
She later adds that for working-class men, “Ensuring the protection of their
families and providing for their security are their foremost concerns.” Id. at 52.
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less work. It should not be permissible for employers to require
more work and thereby also gain a foothold into one’s private life.
This restriction should hold even if the employer provides a
company computer for use outside of the workplace. Often, when
employers provide computers, or phones, or other gadgets for
employee use outside of the workplace, it is thought that the
employer is being generous. But as any lawyer who is entitled to a
free meal after a certain hour at night knows, these “gifts” come
with many strings attached. Employers are rarely gratuitously
generous. In the employment context, one string that should not
attach is a waiver of privacy. Employees working at home, at the
employer’s request, should retain the traditional zone of privacy
that governs the home, and I would suggest this is where we ought
to erect a strong privacy barrier. Simply because the employer
provides a computer to the employee does not mean that the
workplace now extends to wherever that computer goes.29
This is the kind of balance I believe the law ought to strike
when confronting the question I posed at the outset, namely what
do employees deserve, and how much of themselves do they give
up by becoming employees? Employees deserve a realm of
privacy outside of the workplace, one that the employer should
generally not be able to penetrate even if the employer has
legitimate interests. Obviously, the employer’s interests in
intellectual property, theft, harassment, and the like, remain vibrant
when work is performed outside of the traditional workplace. By
the same measure, employers have many alternatives to protect
those interests other than invading the legitimate privacy interests
of their workers. While the employer rightfully controls its own
property, so too must an employee control her own property. One
way to accomplish this goal would be to prohibit employers from
providing equipment that might be used both for personal and
professional work, and instead, require employers to give the
equipment as a gift that thereafter becomes the property of the
employee.
29. As an aside, to the extent the employer considers an employee’s home
an extension of the workplace simply because a computer has been provided,
then the employer ought to also be responsible for complying with all applicable
laws, including health and safety laws. When the Department of Labor issued
an advisory letter during the Clinton Administration indicating that employers
could be held liable for unsafe working conditions in home offices, the employer
communities’ outrage quickly forced a departmental retreat. See Dawn R.
Swink, Telecommuter Law: A New Frontier in Legal Liability, 38 Am. Bus. L.J.
857, 864–71 (2001) (describing the incident). This is an indication of how
imbalanced the law has become when employers are able to successfully oppose
the application of some laws while seeking to enforce others.
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It seems a slightly more difficult question regarding what
authority an employer ought to have when an employee chooses,
for her primary benefit, to work at home. By primary benefit, I
mean not as a way to complete excessive work, or to accommodate
an employer’s lack of space, but rather as a preferred workspace
that presumably enables the employee to obtain benefits that go
beyond the job. In this setting, the employer has a far stronger
interest in protecting its business, and the employee has a far
weaker claim to privacy. At the same time, such an arrangement
should not afford a license for employers to invade the employee’s
home as it chooses.30 Rather, this seems a particularly ripe area for
negotiated agreements, and ideally, the parties would negotiate the
appropriate parameters of the work/nonwork divide.
The
employer, for example, may prohibit the use of its equipment for
anything other than official business, and under those
circumstances, the employee should have no cognizable privacy
interest in the contents of that equipment, and in fact, should need
none. Assuming the employee is choosing to work at home, to the
extent she wants to protect the privacy of her home, she can choose
to work in the office. She can also buy her own computer, cell
phone, or other equipment, and protect her privacy by keeping the
personal and the professional separate.31 While it may be more
convenient, and less expensive to use an employer’s computer for
one’s own private affairs, the price of that convenience may be a
waiver of privacy. Just as the employer should not be able to
compel work at home and treat the home as the office, an
employee should not be able to choose to work at home but then
consider that work private.
Ultimately, focusing on alternatives and the legitimate interests
of the parties, is part of the balance the law should draw, which is
quite different from the way in which the law today typically
30. For a recent discussion of some of the many issues that arise in what is
sometimes dubbed “the virtual workplace” see Michelle A. Travis, Equality in
the Virtual Workplace, 24 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 283 (2003).
31. Although there have not been many cases to date involving the use of
employer-provided computers in the home, this is generally th,e approach courts
have adopted. As the court explained in one such case: “To state the obvious,
no one compelled Zieminski [the employee] or his wife or children to use the
home computer for personal matters, and no one prevented him from purchasing
his own computer for his personal use.” TBG Ins. Servs. v. Superior Court, 96
Cal. App. 4th 443 (2002) (permitting discovery of employer-provided home
computer pursuant to written agreement between the parties). In another high
profile case, the dean of the Harvard Divinity School was removed from his
position when pornography was found on his employer-provided computer. See
Rosen, supra note 1, at 159 (discussing the case).
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defers to employer interests, no matter how weak.32 Within the
workplace, employer interests should typically prevail, but outside
of the workplace, they ought to fail absent some compelling, and
documented, interest.
This leads to two additional areas of concern: employee offwork activity and the issue of employment screening or providing
employers with access to medical information. I will take up the
second issue first, because within my framework, it is a relatively
easy concern to address.
Social norms often define core privacy issues, and with respect
to employee concerns, it would seem that the bathroom and
medical information have obtained core status as matters of
protectable privacy interests.33 Medical information can provide
the most intimate of details, and is perhaps the most common
information we shield from others, and for many reasons. Some of
those reasons have to do with feared discrimination, some with
embarrassment but others simply have to do with a desire not to
allow the medical information to define our public identities. As a
society, we recognize this interest, and I think one reason we find
greater protection for medical information is because it is an issue
that affects all of us, legislators, employers and employees alike.34
Current federal legislation, including the Americans With
Disabilities Act, protects the confidentiality of much medical
information,35 but many employers still display a keen interest in
medical information as it relates to their health insurance costs.
For example, to the extent employers have shown an interest in
genetic screening, which remains prohibitively expensive for most
employers, it typically has to do with controlling health insurance
costs.36 Conceptually, the easiest way to neutralize the employer’s
32. See discussion of off-work activity, infra, where employers typically do
not even have to assert any legitimate interest.
33. See Lawrence O. Gostin, Health Information Privacy, 80 Cornell L.
Rev. 451 (1995) (discussing the importance individuals place in the
confidentiality of medical information).
34. This was made apparent to me at a conference I spoke at recently for
state court judges. When the management attorney argued in favor of providing
employers with broad dominion over employer-provided equipment, some of the
judges nearly leaped out of their chairs at the idea that their employers, or any
employer, could snoop around the computer at will and see private financial and
medical information.
35. The ADA limits information employers can obtain from their employees
and applicants, and requires that whatever information is permissibly collected
be treated as confidential. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14 (2005) (EEOC regulation
relating to health information).
36. For a discussion of genetic screening and the various issues it raises see
Pauline T. Kim, Genetic Discrimination, Genetic Privacy: Rethinking Employee
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interest is to remove health insurance from the employment
relationship altogether, which would severely restrict their need for
specific health or genetic information. Obviously, this is an issue
that goes well beyond concerns of privacy, but at the same time it
demonstrates how we can better preserve employee privacy
interests by effectively downsizing the employment relationship
and by reducing our expectations of work.
Whenever the prospect of stripping health insurance from the
employment relationship arises, there is an immediate concern that
employees would be left worse off because they would be left
without any insurance at all.37 This need not be the case, and there
is very little rationale for having employers provide health
insurance other than that large employers provide a desirably
heterogeneous risk pool for insurers. But such a pool can be
created in other ways such as through community ratings, or even
alumni pools. More to the point, taking health insurance out of the
employment relationship would release an important current
restraint on employee mobility and power. Even though the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act38 facilitates continued
medical coverage, many employees remain fearful of losing their
health insurance if they change or lose their job.39
Protections for a Brave New Workplace, 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1497 (2002). As
Professor Kim notes, genetic testing remains relatively rare in the workplace:
“[L]ittle systemic evidence exists that such testing is a common practice.” Id. at
1511. To the extent employers are interested in using genetic testing, health
care costs seem to be an important motivating factor. Id. at 1540. A substantial
literature has developed around genetic screening. See, e.g., Paul Steven Miller,
Is There a Pink Slip in My Genes? Genetic Discrimination in the Workplace, 3 J.
Health Care L. & Pol’y 225 (2000); Melinda B. Kaufman, Genetic
Discrimination in the Workplace: An Overview of Existing Protections, 30 Loy.
U. Chi. L.J. 393 (1999).
37. Without going into too much detail, let me offer some reasons why
employees do not fare well under the current system. First, employees typically
have very limited choices among health plans, and there is little reason to
believe employers are the best agent for the interests of employees in choosing a
health plan. Second, the costs of health insurance are easily exaggerated, in
large part because it is virtually impossible for employees to determine the
actual costs of the insurance, and many employees are forced to trade income
even when they do not opt for an employer’s insurance. Typically married
couples share a health policy, but employers never offer to provide the cash
equivalent to employees who decline health insurance coverage, even though
benefits are typically a substitute for cash income. Although this is true of many
unused benefits, health insurance now forms the largest portion of employee
benefits and thus, the most significant forfeited benefit among employees.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 1302d (2003).
39. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
makes it easier for employees to obtain health insurance when they change jobs
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Even if employers were stripped of the responsibility for
providing health insurance, they might still claim an interest in
their employee’s medical conditions in order to determine their
potential reliability. This is the sort of interest, however, that
ought to prove wholly inadequate to justify collecting private
medical information. Employees miss work for all kinds of
reasons, and an employee’s past employment history ought to
provide adequate information regarding likely attendance so as to
defeat whatever marginal gain additional information might
provide. If we are to create a greater zone of privacy for
employees, we must re-think the employment-at-will relationship
to the extent that it provides such broad authority for employers to
control or dictate the lives of their employees outside of the
workplace, particularly when not immediately relevant to their
work duties. When the employer’s reach extends beyond the
boundaries of the workplace, the notion so critical to employment
law that the employee can always get another job should be
insufficient to justify personal intrusions.
Another way to obtain a reasonable balance between the
interests of employers and employees with respect to medical
screening would be to require employers to implement screening
across-the-board, to top executives as well as those at the bottom.
My sense is that many employers would shy away from genetic
testing or other health screenings if they were also subject to the
tests.
Today, drug testing is the most prevalent form of health
screening and I will confess that I am a bit indifferent to the
subject. In certain occupations, and among certain employers,
drug testing is so well-entrenched that it seems a bit late to mount
privacy challenges, though successful challenges do occasionally
arise.40 As the war on drugs has faded, there also seems to be less
of an employer interest in drug testing than there was during the
1980s, when much of the testing commenced, and so it seems that

by restricting the force of pre-existing condition clauses, and through some other
means. See 42 U.S. C. § 1320d (2003). Despite this law, a Henry J. Kaiser
Foundation survey found that 24% of the surveyed population indicated they
were staying in their job for fear of losing health insurance if they were to
change jobs. See Victoria Colliver, Stuck on the Job: Fear of Losing Insurance
Keeps Workers from Moving On, S.F. Chron., June 12, 2003, at B-1 (discussing
the survey).
40. The issue of drug testing is thoroughly explored in Professor Pauline
Kim’s contribution to this symposium. See Pauline T. Kim, Collective and
Individual Approaches to Protecting Employee Privacy: The Experience with
Workplace Drug Testing, 66 La. L. Rev. __ (2006).
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we may have arrived at a reasonably stable equilibrium on the
issue. At the same time, drug testing pries into off-work activity
without any necessary proof that drug use is either suspected or
interferes with on-work activity, and from that perspective drug
testing is another manifestation of the many ways in which
employers influence the lives of employees outside of the
workplace.
This leads me to the area that is most troubling in terms of the
expansion of work into private spheres, and that is an employer’s
ability to control off-work activities. Several recent articles have
canvassed this area and Professor Finkin’s symposium contribution
likewise explores the topic,41 and I will confine my comments to
working within the framework I have earlier established of limiting
the employer’s power to the workplace. I should also note that
many off-work activities do not implicate privacy interests insofar
as many of the activities are, in fact, public. In another sense,
these issues do touch on privacy to the extent we seek a
demarcation in what occurs in our private lives from our work
lives, and I think it is in that sense that off-work activity is thought
to infringe on issues of employee privacy.
A number of states have sought to protect off-work activities
legislatively, often at the behest of the tobacco lobby which has
sought to protect off-work smoking.42 These statutes are often
limited in scope, and without specific legislative protection, the
public policy tort provides the best means of protecting
encroachments on off-work activity.43 However, as currently
applied, the public policy tort typically provides only limited
protection, and indeed, offers such limited utility that what ought
to be difficult decisions are frequently decided summarily with
little analysis and without requiring any justification on the
employer’s part.44 The public policy tort should be extended to
41. See Matthew W. Finkin, Life Away From Work, 66 La. L. Rev. __
(2006); Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, What Do You Do When You are Not at Work?
Limiting the Use of Off-Duty Conduct as the Basis for Adverse Employment
Decisions, 6 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 625 (2004); Stephen D. Sugarman,
“Lifestyle” Discrimination in Employment, 24 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 377
(2003).
42. The statutes are chronicled in Finkin, supra note 6, 691–716.
43. What is known as “the public policy tort” provides a cause of action for
wrongful discharge when an employee’s termination violates established public
policy. Most states have adopted some form of the tort, but its scope can vary
substantially by jurisdiction. See Marion G. Crain, Pauline T. Kim & Michael
Selmi, Work Law: Cases and Materials 177–212 (Lexis Law Publishing 2005).
44. See, e.g., Edmonson v. Shearer Lumber Prods., 75 P.3d 733 (Idaho
2003) (upholding termination of employee who spoke out against a project
supported by his employer); Jutey v. John Muir Med. Ctr., 97 Cal. App. 4th 814
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include all off-work activity, and require the employer to
substantiate a legitimate business interest that outweighs the
employee’s interests in order to uphold a termination for off-work
activity. Such an extension would effectively require employers to
articulate, and prove, their legitimate interests, similar to the
current law with respect to the speech of public employees. When
an employee is terminated because of speech that touches on a
matter of public concern, courts conduct a balancing test that
weighs the competing interests.45 The test developed in the speech
context can be quite deferential to employers, and if the speech is
not a matter of public concern, the employee is afforded no
protection at all and the employer need not offer any justification
for its action. As a result, I would propose that any time an
employer terminates an employee for lawful off-work activity, the
employer must provide a compelling justification for its action
sufficient to override the employee’s substantial interest in offwork autonomy.46
Even under this test, employers could often prevail. For
example, if an employee’s off-work conduct could be clearly
attributed to the employer, the employer would likely have a
legitimate interest in protecting its reputation by terminating
employees who are engaged in particular activities that might bring
public opprobrium. Abhorrent public behavior, such as those of a

(Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (permitting employer to terminate an employee for suing a
client of the employer); McCavitt v. Swiss Reinsurance America Co., 237 F.3d
166 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that romantic relationship is not a protected activity
under New York statute that protects recreational activities); Marsh v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1458 (D. Colo. 1997) (upholding termination of
employee who wrote a letter to the editor that was contrary to employer’s
interest); Brunner v. Al Attar, 786 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. App. 1990) (upholding
termination of employee because he volunteered at AIDS foundation).
45. The test was developed in a series of Supreme Court cases including
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 88 S. Ct. 1731 (1968); Connick v.
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 103 S. Ct. 1684 (1983); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S.
378, 107 S. Ct. 2891 (1987).
46. An example of the kind of analysis a court would conduct is found in
Pereira v. Comm’r of Social Serv., 733 N.E. 2d 112 (Mass. 2000). The case
involved an investigator for the Department of Social Services who made a
racist joke at a private banquet for a retiring public official, and her remark was
later reported in newspapers. Although the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts determined the speech was not a matter of public concern,
because it occurred away from work and was not directly related to work, the
court applied the balancing test applicable to speech of public concern. Id. at
120. The court ultimately determined that the Department was justified in
terminating the investigator, in large part because the subsequent publicity of the
remark threatened the image and credibility of the agency.
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white supremacist, might fit this scenario, but only with respect to
those employees who might be readily identified with the
employer. This is likely to be executives rather than rank and file
employees, and as a general matter, I would exclude highly
compensated individuals from any common law public policy
protections (other than whistle blowing, but that is now typically
handled by statute) as they have the power to negotiate
agreements, and also typically have the greatest labor market
mobility. Outside of executive employees, it would be very
difficult for an employer to establish the necessary link between
private employee behavior and the employer’s reputation.
However, if an employee were to use the employer’s identity for
some off-work activity, then the employer ought to be able to
terminate that employee for the conduct, since the employee is
now mixing on- and off-work activity in a way that might be
harmful to the employer’s interest, and for which the employee has
no particular claim of right. The recent case involving a San Diego
police officer who sold pornographic videos that featured him in a
uniform seems an unusually easy case.47 Similarly, the Delta flight
attendant who appeared in her uniform on her blog, in a suggestive
but non-pornographic way, should have no protection for her
subsequent discharge since it was quite possible that the employee,
and her blog, would be identified with her airline.48 Just as
important, she has no claim to a right to appear in her uniform
outside of the workplace.49
How to balance off-work activity with the interests of other
employees is a more delicate matter, and one that does not lend
itself to easy categorization. It may be that our best option is to
47. See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 125 S. Ct. 521 (2004) (per
curiam). Although the officer did not appear in his San Diego Police
Department (SDPD) uniform, he was identified as a law enforcement officer and
elsewhere on eBay did sell SDPD uniforms. As the Court noted, “Although
Roe’s activities took place outside the workplace and purported to be about
objects not related to his employment, the SDPD demonstrated legitimate and
substantial interests of its own were compromised by his speech.” Id. at 81, 125
S. Ct. 524.
48. See Christine Negroni, Fired Flight Attendant Finds Blogs Can
Backfire, N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 2004, at C9 (noting that she had posed
provocatively in her uniform).
49
The flight attendant subsequently filed a sex discrimination lawsuit against
Delta in which she alleged that male flight attendants were allowed to appear in
uniform on blogs without discipline. See Mike Tierney, Ex-Flight Attendant
Sues Delta Over Blog, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, Sep. 8, 2005, at 1E. The
fact that she ended up filing a discrimination, rather than a privacy case,
suggests that despite all the publicity she received, there was likely no basis for
pursing a privacy claim.
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allow our existing antidiscrimination laws to do the work, although
that solution might be more appealing if more states prohibited
discrimination based on sexual orientation, since this is an area that
may pose significant workplace conflicts. But for whatever
reason, conflicts among employees involving off-work conduct do
not seem to arise with much frequency compared to incidents
where employers act in their own apparent business interests to
terminate employees because of off-work activity.
A recent issue involving sexual orientation raised some
interesting privacy and balancing concerns. Last year, Bank of
America asked its employees to identify their sexual orientation in
an anonymous online poll.50 According to the company, and there
is no particular reason to doubt it, they were seeking the
information as part of their broader diversity initiatives and had no
intent to use the information other than in developing programs,
and perhaps benefits, for their employees. At the same time, this
inquiry seems particularly invasive, as many individuals strongly
prefer to keep their sexual orientation private, in a way that is not
necessarily possible with race, gender, and in many instances age
or disability.
Yet, on this issue, it does not strike me that the employer did
anything wrong in inquiring about the employee’s sexual
orientation, and I think the problem lies more in the fact that
differing sexual orientations have not yet gained sufficient societal
acceptance. Even if we had moved to broader social acceptance,
many individuals might still want to keep their sexual preferences
private, and no employer should require that information to be
divulged. But to ask as a way of tailoring employment benefits to
the needs and interests of the workforce seems to me something to
be encouraged, and perhaps if we lived in a more trustful
environment, it would be. Then again, if we did not expect so
much from our employment, if we did not expect health insurance,
life insurance, and so on, there would be no basis for such an
inquiry.
At the Louisiana Law Review symposium where this paper was
originally presented, Professor Matthew Finkin forcefully
challenged the notion that it was necessary to trade privacy within
the workplace for a barrier outside of the workplace.51 He
contended that such a sharp dichotomy was unnecessary, and while
I am sympathetic to his critique, it seems to me that this sharp
distinction is most consistent with the employment-at-will rule,
50. See David Lazarus, Bank of America Survey Asks Workers About Sexual
Orientation, S.F. Chron., Jan. 15, 2005, at C-1.
51. Finkin, supra note 41.
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and I think it is also consistent with my concept of what employees
deserve. On the one hand, allowing employers such broad
dominion over the workplace may functionally turn that workplace
into the equivalent of a prison, where employee rights parallel the
limited rights of prisoners. Yet, this need not be the case. Most
employers will not impose such draconian rules, and if they do, it
ought to be a clarion call for union representation. More to the
point, many lower-rung jobs will always be hugely undesirable.
There is very little we can do to make the jobs at Wal-Mart
pleasant, or to make Wal-Mart treat their employees with respect,
short of overhauling the entire system. And if we were to focus on
improving those jobs, we ought to focus on increasing pay and
providing meaningful health insurance, so long as insurance
continues to be employer driven.
We can, however, seek to keep Wal-Mart out of employee
homes, out of city council meetings, out of their employee’s
private lives. We can do that without modifying the employmentat-will rule and by defining employment more specifically to
include only the time an individual is actually working. Rather
than focusing on workplace privacy, we would be better served by
protecting lawful off-work activities and requiring a substantial
justification when an employer seeks to interfere with those
activities.
IV. CONCLUSION
Workplace privacy has received an inordinate amount of
attention in the last few years, in part because of the growing
concerns regarding the invasion of privacy outside of the
workplace. Yet, within the workplace, most employees cannot
claim any level of entitlement to “seclusion” or to privacy, and
rather than focusing on such issues, employees would benefit by
efforts designed to restrict employers’ reach from extending
beyond the workplace.

